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RACIAL PROFILING IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY: PROTECTING 
MINORITY TRAVELERS’ CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 
Yevgenia S. Kleiner* 
Abstract: Government-sponsored ethnic and racial profiling in the form 
of computerized and behavioral screening initiatives implemented as a 
response to 9/11 has led to the subjection of minorities to increased 
scrutiny and suspicion in American airports. In the name of national 
security, safety protocols are being enacted in non-uniform ways that 
disproportionally infringe on minority passengers’ civil liberties and 
reinforce harmful racial stereotypes. Focusing on the dissonance between 
basic freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the 
security policies implemented by the federal government, this Note 
argues that the disparity in scrutiny received by minority travelers is 
counterproductive because it reinforces racism and ethnocentrism as 
social norms and fails to ensure a consistent level of protection for all 
passengers. This Note ultimately advocates for a federal government 
mandate that delineates a universal, race-blind standard for the level of 
scrutiny (and accompanying procedures) that all passengers should be 
subjected to while traveling aboard commercial aircraft. 
Introduction 
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. 
—Benjamin Franklin1 
 On January 1, 2009, AirTran Airways officials ordered nine Muslim 
passengers off AirTran flight 175, a Washington, D.C. flight bound for 
Orlando, Florida.2 The group of travelers, all of South Asian descent, 
                                                                                                                      
*Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 6 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 242 (Leonard W. Labtree et al. eds., Yale Univ. 
Press 1963). 
2 See Amy Gardner, 9 Muslim Passengers Removed from Jet, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 2009, at B1; 
Liz Robbins, Muslim Family Excluded from AirTran Flight, The Lede N.Y. Times News Blog, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/muslim-fasmily-excluded-from-airtran-flight/ 
( Jan. 2, 2009, 12:12 PM EST). 
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consisted of three young boys ages two, four and seven, two adult 
brothers, their wives, a sister-in-law, and a family friend who coinciden-
tally happened to be on the same flight.3 All but one of the nine pas-
sengers were U.S.-born American citizens.4 Moreover, Abdul Aziz, the 
family friend, is an attorney for the United States Library of Congress.5 
The Irfan family was on their way to a vacation in Orlando, Florida, 
where they planned to visit family and attend a religious retreat.6 When 
two teenage girls aboard the aircraft reported a conversation between 
Atif Irfan and his wife regarding the “safest seats” on an airplane, fed-
eral air marshals aboard the flight notified the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) about a potential security concern.7 In response 
to the notification by the air marshals, the FBI ordered the Irfan family 
and Mr. Aziz off the plane.8 
 While the Irfan family and Mr. Aziz were questioned in a quaran-
tined area of the passenger lounge (where authorities forbade the three 
young boys from consuming food contained in the family’s carry-on 
luggage), the plane’s remaining ninety-five passengers and their luggage 
were re-screened, as were the crew and the airplane itself.9 Although the 
FBI concluded that Mr. Aziz and the Irfan family posed no danger to the 
airline or its passengers and informed AirTran that the passengers were 
cleared to travel, the airline refused to rebook the flights and offered 
only to refund the cost of the original tickets.10 While AirTran spokes-
man Tad Hutcheson agreed that the incident was the result of a misun-
derstanding, he affirmed that AirTran’s “better safe than sorry” ap-
proach complied with strict federal rules on responding to potential 
security threats and downplayed the ethnic-profiling aspect of the inci-
dent.11 In a similar statement, Ellen Howe, a spokeswoman for the TSA, 
told the Washington Post that this incident “just highlights that security is 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Gardner, supra note 2; Mike Ahlers, “Safest” Seat Remarks Get Muslim Family Kicked 
Off Plane, CNN, Jan. 2, 2009, http://cnn.com/2009/US/01/01/family.grounded/index. 
html. 
4 See Robbins, supra note 2. 
5 See Ahlers, supra note 3; Robbins, supra note 2. Among the Irfan family members on 
the flight were thirty-four year old Kashif Irfan, an anesthesiologist, and his twenty-nine 
year old brother, Atif Irfan, an attorney. See Gardner, supra note 2. 
6 See Gardner, supra note 2; Ahlers, supra note 3. 
7 See Ahlers, supra note 3; Robbins, supra note 2. 
8 See Ahlers, supra note 3. 
9 See id.; Robbins, supra note 2. 
10 See Gardner, supra note 2; Robbins, supra note 2. The FBI agents were able to assist 
the family in booking a later U.S. Airways flight to Orlando, but the flight was twice as 
expensive as the family’s original AirTran seats. See Robbins, supra note 2. 
11 See Gardner, supra note 2; Robbins, supra note 2. 
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everybody’s responsibility. Someone heard something that was inappro-
priate, and then the airline decided to act on it. We certainly support 
[the pilot’s] call to do that.”12 Not surprisingly, the Muslim passengers 
removed from the flight reacted differently to the experience.13 Atif Ir-
fan told CNN, “Really, at the end of the day, we’re not out here looking 
for money. I’m an attorney. I know how the court system works. We’re 
basically looking for someone to say . . . ‘We’re apologizing for treating 
you as second class-citizens.’”14 
 In an age where terrorists use mass transportation as a forum to 
execute attacks, federal agencies have their hands full as they work to 
protect the American people and keep public transportation running 
smoothly and safely.15 In recent years, the U.S. government has taken 
steps to improve its ability to ensure domestic security—steps that have 
earned criticism for subordinating civil liberties protections to national 
security interests.16 Perhaps the most notorious of these measures was 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, more com-
monly known by the nationalistic acronym, USA PATRIOT Act, which 
President George W. Bush signed into law on October 26, 2001.17 
Drafted in secrecy “under [the] cloak of national security,” the gov-
ernment used the USA PATRIOT Act to include domestic terrorism in 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Gardner, supra note 2. 
13 See Ahlers, supra note 3. 
14 Id. 
15 See UCLA Int’l Inst., Terror on Mass Transit, July 7, 2005, http://www.international. 
ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=26530. Episodes within the past fifteen years include the 
release of sarin gas into the Tokyo Metro in 1995, frequent bus bombings in Israel in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the March 2004 attacks on trains in Madrid, the July 2005 bombings 
of the London Underground and the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter in New York. See id. 
16 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.; 5 U.S.C. §§ 5315, 8331; 26 U.S.C. 
§ 9502; 31 U.S.C. § 1105). 
17 See id. The USA PATRIOT Act’s stated intention is “to deter and punish terrorist acts 
in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory 
tools, and for other purposes.” See id. Just as many of the provisions of the 2001 USA PA-
TRIOT Act were about to sunset in 2005, the House of Representatives passed the USA 
Terrorism Prevention and Reauthorization Act, aimed to reinstate and maintain most of 
the original language from the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. See USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-77, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1). In the same month, the Senate passed its own version of the Act and made revisions 
to parts of the original Act that were criticized as violating individuals’ civil rights. 151 
Cong. Rec. S13546–61 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2005) (statements of Sens. First, Feingold and 
Sessions). 
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its definition of the types of terrorist activities under its purview—a 
move that garnered criticism for the broad scope of power it afforded 
the government.18 
 Of all of the federal agencies criticized for abusing their discretion 
under the PATRIOT Act, the TSA has perhaps suffered the most vehe-
ment attacks for violating travelers’ civil liberties.19 Formed in response 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Walter M. Brasch, America’s Unpatriotic Acts 4 (2005). The PATRIOT Act 
allows police officers to search suspects’ homes and offices without a warrant and without 
notifying them prior to the search. See id. at 12. The bill also allows the Attorney General to 
detail persons based on mere suspicion. See id. 
19 See generally National Security Letters: The Need for Greater Accountability and Oversight: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1–34 (2008) (statements of Sens. 
Patrick J. Leahy, Arlen Specter, Russell Feingold, Benjamin L. Cardin, Sheldon White-
house; statements of James A. Baker, Former Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Dep’t of Just.; 
Gregory T. Nojeim, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology, Center for De-
mocracy & Technology; Michael J. Woods, Former Chief, National Security Law Unit, Of-
fice of the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing the dangers of 
reauthorizing and expanding the USA PATRIOT Act); Misuse of Patriot Act Powers: The In-
spector General’s Findings of Improper Use of the National Security Letters by the FBI: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. S4039 (2007) (statement of Sen. Feingold). Since 
September 11th, Arab, Middle Eastern and Muslim women, particularly those who wear 
the traditional hijab, or veil, have been the targets of street and airport profiling and have 
endured discriminatory searches because of their appearance. See Andrea J. Ritchie & Joey 
L. Mogul, In the Shadows of the War on Terror: Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of People of 
Color in the United States, 1 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 175, 208 (2008). Several incidents that took 
place in U.S. airports in late 2001, when post-September 11th fear was at a high, are illus-
trative of this discrimination. See id. In November 2001, a twenty-two year-old Muslim-
American woman was subjected to a full body search and was made to remove her head-
scarf so that security officers (albeit females) could run their fingers through her hair after 
the woman passed through an airport security metal detector without setting it off and 
after a metal detector passed along her body also did not go off. See Leadership Confer-
ence on Civil Rights Education Fund (LCCREF), Wrong Then, Wrong Now: Racial 
Profiling Before & After September 11, 2001, at 28 (2003), available at http://www. 
civilrights.org/publications/wrong-then/racial_profiling_report.pdf. In December 2001, 
police stopped a Muslim woman in a hijab for driving with suspended plates. See Ritchie & 
Mogul, supra, at 208. In any other situation, the police would have likely demanded the 
driver to produce her driver’s license and registration and then issued her a ticket. See id. 
In this case, however, the officer arrested the driver, shoved her into the patrol car and 
made inappropriate remarks about her veil and her religion. Id. 
Even five years after September 11, the merits of racial profiling in airports continue 
to be debated in the media. See, e.g., Editorial, The “Profiling” Debate, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 
2006, at A10. The editorial states: 
 Nobody is suggesting using ethnicity or religion as the only—or even the 
primary—factors in profiling terrorists. But it also makes no sense to take zero 
account of the fact that every suicide attack against U.S. aviation to date has 
been perpetrated by men of Muslim origin. While al Qaeda is no doubt seek-
ing recruits who don't obviously display such characteristics, that doesn’t 
mean we should ignore the likeliest candidates. 
 . . . . 
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to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the TSA is an agency of 
the Department of Homeland Security and is responsible for screening 
all airline passengers.20 Now that airlines can no longer use independ-
ent contractors to supply their security personnel, all of the screeners 
currently employed in U.S. airports are federal employees.21 In imple-
menting directives aimed at ensuring the nation’s security, TSA em-
ployees, and thus the federal government, have been accused of dis-
criminating against minority travelers in violation of constitutionally 
protected rights.22 As the experiences of the Irfan family and countless 
others demonstrate, the TSA’s current methods of ensuring passengers’ 
safety often result in unnecessary delays and examinations prompted by 
loose directives and unconstitutional prejudices.23 
                                                                                                                      
 The law on this is settled, and in the other direction. On multiple occa-
sions the federal courts have upheld programs that treat groups differently 
when a “compelling” public interest can be identified: affirmative action, mi-
nority set-asides, composition of Congressional districts, and the all-male draft 
have all met that legal test. Yet the same people who would allocate jobs, fed-
eral contracts and college admissions by race or ethnicity object to using 
them merely as one factor in deciding whom to inconvenience for a few min-
utes at an airline checkpoint. Surely aviation security is a far more compelling 
public interest than the allocation of federal set-asides. 
Id. But see Timothy M. Ravich, Is Airline Passenger Profiling Necessary?, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 
41 n.191 (2007) (citing Naureen Kamdar, Editorial, Muslim Americans Are Americans, Too: 
Airport Security’s Stereotypical Act Shames System, Atlanta J. Const., Feb. 20, 2007, at A11). 
20 See TSA, What is TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is_tsa.shtm (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2009). In response to September 11, 2001, Congress federalized the aviation secu-
rity system. See Ravich, supra note 19, at 20 n.95. Before 2001, airline security was the re-
sponsibility of individual airline companies. See id. 
21 See TSA, Our People, http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/people/index.shtm (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2009). The TSA website reports that TSA employs 45,000 security officers who 
oversee security operations at over 450 airports located in the U.S. and its territories. See 
TSA, Contact Us, http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/claims/contact.shtm (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2009). 
22 See Kip Hawley, TSA’s Take on the Atlantic Article, The TSA Blog, http://www.tsa. 
gov/blog/2008/10/tsas-take-on-atlantic-article.html (Oct. 21, 2008, 14:19 EST) (writing 
on a blog site maintained by the TSA in which the public is encouraged to react—and 
often does, negatively—to the TSA’s methods of ensuring security on public transporta-
tion). 
23 See Gardner, supra note 2. On August 4, 2007, a new TSA policy permitting all per-
sons wearing head coverings through airport security checkpoints to be searched went into 
effect. See Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical 
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 Hastings Race & Poverty L. J. 
441, 494 (2008). Although the TSA maintains that this policy requires those passengers 
wearing cowboy hats and baseball caps to remove them, Muslim and Sikh community lead-
ers have argued that because enforcement of the policy is at the discretion of TSA screen-
ers, the policy provides TSA officials “an opportunity for profiling and violating civil 
rights.” See id. at 494–95. To be sure, TSA has been taken to court for discrimination: al-
though the case settled for $240,000 on January 5, 2009, the ACLU filed suit against the 
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 The tragic events of September 11, 2001 introduced a fear of ter-
rorism into Americans’ daily lives and inspired in many a suspicion of 
immigrants of Muslims and Middle Eastern descent.24 Compounding 
the dangerous environment of racism these fears engender is what Jef-
frey Goldberg, an acclaimed Israeli-American journalist, calls American 
“security theater.”25 Goldberg argues that airport security in America is 
a sham, entirely incapable of dealing with a myriad of security vulner-
abilities, and accuses the security system of being able to catch only the 
most careless and “stupid” of terrorists.26 If Goldberg is right, his argu-
                                                                                                                      
TSA in August 2007 for its role in refusing to let a man wearing a t-shirt that read “We Will 
Not Be Silent” in English and Arabic board a JetBlue Airways flight. See ACLU, TSA Offi-
cials and JetBlue Pay $240,000 To Settle Discrimination Charges, Jan. 5, 2009, http:// 
www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen/38225prs20090105.html. 
24 See Abby Sullivan, Note, On Thin Ice: Cracking Down on the Racial Profiling of Immi-
grants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement Policy, 6 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 
101, 102 (2009). 
25 See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried, Atlantic, Nov. 2008, at 100. Most likely 
because of his skin color, Goldberg has managed to pass airport checkpoints while carry-
ing a variety of suspicious objects he acquired as a reporter writing on terrorism. See id. at 
100, 102. These items include al-Qaeda t-shirts, Islamic Jihad flags, Hezbollah videotapes, 
inflatable Yasir Arafat dolls, pocketknives, matches from hotels in Beirut and Peshawar, 
dust masks, lengths of rope, cigarette lighters, nail clippers, eight-ounce tubes of tooth-
paste, and box cutters. See id. at 102. Perhaps one of the most curious items that Goldberg 
managed to smuggle through airport security was a device known as the Beerbelly, a neo-
prene sling that suspends a polyurethane bladder and drinking tube over one’s stomach. 
See id. Designed originally for sports fans who want to avoid paying for overpriced alcohol 
at football stadiums, a terrorist could use a Beerbelly to smuggle eighty ounces of a liquid 
into an airport and past airport security. See id. Other items that Goldberg smuggled, in-
cluding a Leatherman Multi-Tool knife, a pair of nail clippers, a can of shaving cream and 
an eight-ounce bottle of water, were seized by the federal government. See id. Unsurpris-
ingly, Jewish-American reporters are not the only individuals who smuggle contraband into 
airports to prove a point. See Amnesty Int’l USA, Threat and Humiliation: Racial 
Profiling, Domestic Security, and Human Rights in the United States 24–25 (2004). 
In October 2003, college student Nathaniel Heatwole, a North Carolina resident, was 
charged with a felony for smuggling knives, box cutters, bleach, and items with the same 
consistency as plastic explosives onto six Southwest Airlines flights. Id. Heatwole had sent 
email messages to TSA regarding the location of the materials, but was ignored for over a 
month. See id. at 25. When he was finally caught, Heatwole claimed that he had acted in 
civil disobedience in order to improve airline security and revealed that TSA had only 
found his planted materials on two of six airplanes. See id. The charges against Heatwole 
were reduced to a misdemeanor, and at the time of the AIUSA report, he had been re-
leased on bail and was awaiting trial. See id. 
26 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 100, 103–04. Among the airport vulnerabilities he 
identified while researching the attentiveness of airport security officials, Goldberg found 
a handful of weak points particularly troubling. See id. at 103–04. Whereas pilots and air-
line crew members are screened by magnetometers (metal detectors) and their belongings 
are searched daily, airport employees, such as those who work in airport kiosks and restau-
rants, those who drive fuel trucks and operate the mechanized gates, and those who per-
form janitorial work are not regularly screened. See id. at 104. Passengers who are eligible 
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ment lends support to the idea that existing security programs can be 
only partially successful because they assume that terrorists will wage 
future attacks using the same methods they used in the past.27 If true, 
this theory would mean that the U.S. government is wasting millions of 
dollars on security equipment that is either obsolete or more likely to 
be put to use on an unsuspecting minority traveler than against a real 
terrorist.28 Some authorities on the subject go so far as to argue that the 
United States would be better served if airport security was returned to 
pre-September 11 levels and the remaining funds allocated for intelli-
gence, investigations and emergency response.29 Until then, airlines 
continue to run the risk of conducting the most in-depth security 
checks on those who fit a certain ethnic or racial category—a method 
that succeeds primarily in embarrassing and delaying travelers of cer-
tain ‘inconvenient’ backgrounds while trampling on their civil rights.30 
 The history of the United States is littered with similar examples of 
(what are now regarded as) civil rights abuses during periods of mass 
                                                                                                                      
for Elite Status have the convenience of expedited boarding on some airlines, suggesting 
perhaps that the wealthy may be less carefully scrutinized during the boarding process. See 
id. at 102. Medical supplies, such as saline solution for contact lens cleaning, do not fall 
under TSA’s three-ounce rule, which means that a terrorist could not only carry a bottle of 
contraband labeled “saline solution” through security with little difficulty, but that he 
could mix the contents of several three-ounce vials once aboard. See id. at 103. Passengers 
are checked against No-Fly Lists when they purchase their tickets, but not before they 
board the plane. Id. This means that a terrorist could well purchase a ticket with someone 
else’s credit card (a stolen one, for instance), thus avoiding a comparison of his name 
against those on the No-Fly List. Id. Furthermore, airlines have ceased to compare passen-
gers’ IDs with the names on their boarding passes before allowing them to board the air-
craft. See id. In their interview, Kip Hawley did tell Goldberg that TSA can follow passen-
gers’ progress from the printer to the gate. See id. at 104. Finally, Goldberg found fault with 
the efficacy of TSA’s SPOT (Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques) Pro-
gram, which is intended to identify terrorists through “behavior detection.” See id. at 103. 
The training program for officers who perform behavior detection work is one week long, 
but this was insufficient training to prepare officers to detect the contraband Goldberg 
had hidden among his carry-ons. See id. 
27 See id. at 102–103. 
28 See Secure Flight and Registered Traveler: A Flawed Assumption That Behavior Is Predictable 
Leads to New Security Weaknesses While Threatening Civil Liberties and Privacy: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 152d Cong. 58–71 (2006) (testimony of 
Timothy D. Sparapani, ACLU Legis. Counsel). 
29 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 103. 
30 See U.S. Const. amend. IV, XIV (guarding against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and providing for substantive and procedural due process rights, respectively); 
LCCREF, supra note 19, at 28; Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 208; Goldberg, supra note 
25, at 103. 
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hysteria and great fear.31 Historical examples include the Alien and Se-
dition Acts (late eighteenth century statutes that allowed for the expa-
triation, fining and sentencing of persons found to oppose or defame 
the United States) and the Supreme Court’s 1944 Korematsu deci-
sion(affirming the constitutionality of the evacuation of Japanese-
Americans during World War II), as well as the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act (expanding the federal government’s ability to investigate individu-
als and entities suspected of threatening national security interests), all 
of which stand for putting civil liberties on the proverbial ‘back burner’ 
in times of national crisis.32 However, the Supreme Court’s recent hold-
ing in Boumediene v. Bush as well as President Barack Obama’s vow to 
close the prison in Guantanamo Bay within a year of taking office sug-
gest that the general holding of Korematsu has been weakened and 
should be re-examined with respect to the importance of civil liberties.33 
 This Note analyzes the implications of recent government action 
and constitutional interpretation for the TSA’s approach to ensuring 
the security of commercial air travel. Part I provides background on the 
U.S. government’s profiling of suspects in the War on Terror based on 
race and ethnicity and introduces, from a constitutional perspective, the 
danger racial profiling poses to minorities’ civil liberties. Part II presents 
the government’s dual challenges of ensuring the safety and welfare of 
airline passengers while simultaneously protecting their constitutionally-
guaranteed rights in an efficient and non-arbitrary manner. Part III 
then evaluates the constitutionality and effectiveness of the govern-
ment’s computer technology and behavioral profiling mechanisms. This 
section also evaluates the government’s new Secure Flight program and 
the Secure Flight Final Rule that went into effect December 29, 2008. 
Part IV considers the challenges and merits of incorporating a race-
blind security clearance system in airports and discounts various alterna-
tives to a race-blind system. In concluding that race-blind, universally 
stringent security measures are the only method by which a constitu-
tionally sound airport security system may be established, Part V reasons 
that TSA and U.S. airports must abandon computerized and behavioral 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Louis Fisher, The Constitution and 9/11, at 78–79, 149–50, 363 (2008); Mar-
cus Raskin & Robert Spero, The Four Freedoms Under Siege: The Clear and Present 
Danger from Our National Security State 3–5 (2007). 
32 See Fisher, supra note 31, at 78–79, 149–50, 363; Raskin & Spero, supra note 31, at 
35–36. 
33 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262–63, 2277 (2008) (holding that de-
tainees are not barred from seeking habeas relief or invoking the Suspension Clause 
merely because they have been designated as enemy combatants or held at the Guan-
tanamo Bay prison); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 ( Jan. 22, 2009). 
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profiling programs in favor of a better-developed and more extensive 
physical security screening program that assumes that every airline pas-
senger is equally capable, and even equally likely, to pose a security 
threat. 
I. Civil Liberties and the Government’s War on Terror 
 While no one definition of racial profiling can be held above oth-
ers as the most accurate, government agencies, non-profit groups, and 
bills proposed in Congress have all attempted to define the phrase.34 
                                                                                                                      
34 See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) of 2005, S. 2138, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) 
(defining racial profiling as the reliance of law enforcement on race, ethnicity, national 
origin, or religion in selecting which individuals to subject to investigations); Amnesty 
Int’l USA, supra note 25, at v (defining racial profiling as the targeting of individuals and 
groups by law enforcement officials, even partially, on the basis of race, ethnicity, national 
origin, or religion, except where there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality 
and timeframe, that links persons belonging to one of the aforementioned groups to an 
identified criminal incident or scheme); Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Guid-
ance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.php (defining 
racial profiling as the invidious use of race or ethnicity in conducting stops, searches and 
seizures and other law enforcement investigative procedures and finding it to be premised 
on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is 
more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of another race or 
ethnicity). In its June 2003 Guidance, the Department of Justice condemned racial profil-
ing in law enforcement as “not merely wrong, but also ineffective” and stated that “[r]ace-
based assumptions in law enforcement perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are 
harmful to our rich and diverse democracy, and materially impair our efforts to maintain a 
fair and just society.” See Civil Rights Div., supra. The Guidance defined racial profiling 
as: 
[T]he invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting stops, 
searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures. It is premised 
on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or 
ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individ-
ual of another race or ethnicity. 
Id. The version of ERPA proposed in 2005 defines racial profiling as: 
The practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to any degree, on race, eth-
nicity, religion, or national origin in selecting which individuals to subject to 
routine or spontaneous investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the scope 
and substance of law enforcement activity following the initial investigatory 
procedure, except where there is trustworthy information, relevant to the lo-
cality and time frame, that links persons of a particular race, ethnicity, relig-
ion, or national origin to an identified criminal incident or scheme. 
ERPA, S. 2138, at § 2. In an October 2004 report, Amnesty International defined racial 
profiling as: 
[T]he targeting of individuals and groups by law enforcement officials, even 
partially, on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion, except 
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Although the definitions entail varying levels of contempt for racial 
profiling, all hold that the use of criteria based on race, national origin, 
religion or ethnicity as the sole rationale for scrutinizing and searching 
certain individuals constitutes unlawful racial profiling based on the 
erroneous belief that these individuals are more likely than others to 
engage in proscribed conduct.35 Not surprisingly, overt racism brought 
to light is loudly and vehemently condemned by the courts and in the 
media.36 But whereas law enforcement agents rarely target individuals 
solely based on race, empirical evidence indicates that race is often “the” 
decisive factor in law enforcement decisions regarding who should be 
searched and questioned.37 It is the position of this Note that racial pro-
filing is wrong because it is both ineffective in ensuring security and 
constitutionally unlawful.38 
 In his introduction to the 2004 Amnesty International (AIUSA) 
report, Threat and Humiliation: Racial Profiling, Domestic Security and Hu-
man Rights in the United States, the Honorable Timothy K. Lewis admon-
ished the U.S. government that “focusing on race, ethnicity, national 
origin, or religion as a proxy for criminal behavior has always failed as a 
means to protect society from criminal activity.”39 Instead, profiling has 
left society more susceptible to discriminatory abuse.40 The AIUSA re-
port identified racial profiling as a threat to U.S. national security, find-
ing that targeting millions of innocent Americans has “undermined . . . 
law enforcement agencies’ ability to detect actual domestic security 
threats and apprehend serial killers, assassins, and other purveyors of 
terror.”41 Race-based profiling jeopardizes the effectiveness of anti-
terrorist security measures because it prevents law enforcement officials 
from focusing on the real target—dangerous behaviors and legitimate 
                                                                                                                      
where there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality and time-
frame, that links persons belonging to one of the aforementioned groups to 
an identified criminal incident or scheme. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at v. 
35 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at v; LCCREF, supra note 19, at 11. 
36 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 11; Kamdar, supra note 20; The “Profiling” Debate, supra 
note 20. 
37 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 11. The Department of Justice, in the absence of a de-
scription of the suspect, defines “profiling” as relying in whole or in part on an individual’s 
race. See id. at 11 n.17. 
38 See infra Part III. 
39 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at ix. The Honorable Timothy K. Lewis is 
Chair of Amnesty International’s National Hearings on Racial Profiling and is a former 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. 
40 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 19–22. 
41 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at xv. 
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threats—and poses great risks to our society’s criminal justice system and 
constitutional protections.42 Despite the hidden risks racial profiling 
poses to national security, AIUSA’s report conservatively estimates that 
one in three people living in the United States, or approximately eighty-
seven million individuals out of a population of approximately 281 mil-
lion, are at risk of being subjected to some form of racial profiling.43 
 Although racial profiling implies the identification and singling-out 
of suspects of color, the reality is that anybody can be a terrorist, regard-
less of background, age, sex, ethnicity, education and economic status.44 
The recent cases of alleged “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh and 
British “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, for example, revealed that Al 
Qaeda has the ability to recruit sympathizers of diverse backgrounds.45 
Lindh, a white U.S. citizen, and Reid, a British citizen, would not have 
necessarily been identified by existing programs like the National Secu-
rity Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and US-VISIT, which tar-
get Arab, Muslim and South Asian men and boys.46 Like Lindh and 
                                                                                                                      
42 See id. at 23; LCCREF, supra note 19, at 11. Reacting to Amnesty International’s report, 
Curt Goering, senior deputy executive director of AIUSA, told Indian Country Today, “Racial 
profiling blinds law enforcement to real criminal threats and creates a hole in the national 
security net large enough to drive a truck through.” See Brenda Norrell, Amnesty International: 
Victims of Racial Profiling, Indian Country Today, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.indiancoun-
trytoday.com/archive/28173234.html. Other effects of racial profiling include feelings of 
degradation, alienation and humiliation in those subjected to it. See LCCREF, supra note 19, 
at 19, 21. Furthermore, racial profiling contributes to the disparity in arrest and crime rates 
between minority and majority populations. See id. 
43 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 2. This figure was based on the number of 
U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and “other long-term visitors” whom the U.S. Census 
categorizes as African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic/Latino Americans, Arab 
Americans, Iranian Americans, Asian Americans (including South Asians), Muslim Ameri-
cans, Sikh Americans, and immigrants and visitors from Africa, Asia, South America, Mex-
ico, Central American and the Caribbean. See id. at 1–2. These figures do not accommo-
date for the U.S. Census’s widely reported undercounting of citizens, residents and others 
of color. See id. at 2. 
44 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 3 n.6 (citing Richard W. Bloom, Commentary on the Moti-
vational Psychology of Terrorism Against Transportation Systems: Implications for Airline Safety and 
Transportation Law, 25 Transp. L.J. 175, 179 (1998)) (“[M]ost profilers analyze external 
features, such as physical characteristics, behaviors or demographics. However, intrapsy-
chic processes may be more robust correlates of terrorist behavior, but are more difficult 
to identify. Yet, some psychologists even believe that these correlates either do not exist or 
are irrelevant in analyzing behavior.”) 
45 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at ix–x. 
46 See id. at 16–17. NSEERS established a series of regulations and registration re-
quirements (including fingerprinting and being photographed and questioned) for all 
male nationals of twenty-five countries which, with the exception of North Korea, are all 
Arab and Muslim. See ACLU, Sanctioned Bias: Racial Profiling Since 9/11, at 6–7 
(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/racial%20profiling%20report.pdf. US-
VISIT is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Program that provides visa-issuing posts 
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Reid, Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh eluded arrest in 1995 
while law enforcement searched for Arab suspects and detained a Jor-
danian.47 
 While minority groups are most frequently singled out as suspects 
because of their race, racial profiling can also cause law enforcement 
officials to wrongly pursue majority targets.48 During the 2002 search 
for the D.C. area snipers, police officers focused on finding a white sus-
pect because the standard profile of a serial killer is a disaffected white 
male acting alone or with a single accomplice.49 The police ignored the 
possibility that two black men, whose blue Chevrolet Caprice was seen 
near one of the shooting sites and who were stopped at least ten times 
during the course of the investigation, were actually at fault, allowing 
snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo to continue their 
killing spree while officials searched for “a white man in a white van.”50 
Overly focused on race, the officials overlooked the fact that Muham-
mad had a military background and was embittered at having lost cus-
tody of his children following his divorce—characteristics that are often 
associated with serial killers.51 
 This reality leads scholars, security experts and political pundits to 
disagree over whether racial profiling systems are able to accurately 
predict which individuals are likely to commit acts of terror.52 Further 
exacerbating the problem is that attempts at racial profiling are often 
improperly executed, resulting in the ‘mis-targeting’ of individuals who 
are mistaken for Muslim Arabs.53 American Sikhs, for example, are one 
                                                                                                                      
and ports of entry using biometric technology that enables the U.S. government to estab-
lish and verify travelers’ identities. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., US-VISIT Traveler Infor-
mation, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/content_multi_image_0006.shtm (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2009). 
47 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 24; LCCREF, supra note 19, at 27. 
48 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 24. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. Failed attempts at racial profiling are nothing new: over 100 years before the 
D.C. sniper case, the Secret Service overlooked the man who assassinated President 
McKinley, focusing instead on a seemingly suspicious African American who turned out to 
be a former law enforcement officer. See id. at 23–34 (citing Eric Rauchway, Murdering 
McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt’s America 18 (2003)). 
52 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 3; America After 9/11: Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost?: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. D1291 (2003) (statement of former 
Rep. Bob Barr, R-GA). 
53 See generally Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japa-
nese American Internment, 17 Crim. Just. 52, 58 (2002) (arguing that in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, just as during the internment of Japanese Americans after the Second 
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group that has experienced unfair prejudice as a result of their skin 
color, accents and style of dress because they have been confused with 
Muslim Arabs.54 Such mistakes highlight the ignorance of many secu-
rity officials; the fact is that “all Arabs are not Muslim, and all Muslims 
are not Arab.”55 In the United States, most Arab Americans are not 
Muslim and most Muslim Americans are South Asian or African Ameri-
can.56 Some Muslims who are assumed to be Arab are, for example, 
Iranian; a majority of Arab-Americans who are assumed to be Muslim 
are Christian Arabs.57 
 Finally, racial profiling is wrong as a matter of constitutional law 
because it treats travelers unequally and discriminates against those 
who are perceived, often wrongly, as posing the greatest security risk.58 
Critics of airline passenger profiling have argued that computerized 
screening programs—such as CAPPS I, CAPPS II, Registered Traveler 
and the new Secure Flight program—are inherently “biased against 
passengers with connections to areas of the world whose behavior or 
policies conflict with the interests of the United States—namely the 
Middle East. As such, critics believe that profiling promotes an uncon-
stitutional categorization of travelers by ethnicity, race, religion, or a 
combination of all three.”59 Many such critics fear that TSA will be un-
able to design and implement egalitarian screening programs that “ig-
nore the shared ethnic, geo-cultural, or religious backgrounds of the 
September 11 terrorists” and therefore urge the government to con-
sider alternative solutions.60 
                                                                                                                      
World War, the government “permit[ted] low probabilities to prevail over civil liberties” in 
trying to identify the opposition). 
54 See id. 
55 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 43 n.85. 
56 See Wu, supra note 53, at 58. 
57 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 43 n.85. A July 2002 Gallup Poll showed that public 
perception had turned slightly in favor of racial profiling, for example, fifty-three percent 
of respondents favored requiring all Arabs, including American citizens, to undergo “spe-
cial, more intensive security checks” before being permitted to board an airplane. See Ruth 
Singer, Race Ipsa? Racial Profiling, Terrorism and the Future, 1 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 293, 299–
300 (2008) (citing Darren K. Carlson, Civil Rights: A Profile in Profiling, Gallup, July 9, 
2002, http://www.gallup.com/poll/6361/Civil-Rights-Profile-Profiling.aspx). 
58 See U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Ravich, supra note 19, at 8. 
59 Ravich, supra note 19, at 8. For more information regarding these computerized 
screening programs, see infra Part III.A. 
60 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
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II. Striking a Balance: The Government’s Post-9/11 War on 
Terror and its Efforts to Protect Civil Liberties 
 The United States has a dark history pertaining to the treatment of 
racial and ethnic minorities in times of war and domestic conflict.61 As 
Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russell Feingold stated in his 2001 Con-
gressional address criticizing the contents of the USA PATRIOT Act: 
 There have been periods in our nation's history when civil 
liberties have taken a back seat to what appeared at the time to 
be the legitimate exigencies of war. Our national conscious-
ness still bears the stain and the scars of those events: The 
Alien and Sedition Acts, the suspension of habeas corpus dur-
ing the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans, 
German-Americans, and Italian-Americans during World War 
II, the blacklisting of supposed Communist sympathizers dur-
ing the McCarthy era, and the surveillance and harassment of 
anti-war protesters, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., dur-
ing the Vietnam War.62 
 One explanation for these stains in our nation’s history is that in 
times of mass hysteria, the legislature and the courts tend to subordi-
nate civil rights in their effort to keep the peace.63 Many scholars have 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Wu, supra note 53, at 52–53, 57–58. 
62 Senator Russell Feingold, Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill, From the Senate 
Floor (Oct. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Feingold, On the Anti-Terrorism Bill]. Senator Feingold 
went on to warn his fellow lawmakers, “We must not allow these pieces of our past to be-
come prologue.” See id. The Democratic leadership at the time rejected attempts by Sena-
tor Feingold, then the chair of the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights sub-
committee of the Committee of the Judiciary to introduce amendments to the USA 
PATRIOT Act. See Brasch, supra note 18, at 5; see also Russell Feingold, Why I Opposed the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill, Counterpunch, Oct. 26, 2001, http://www.counterpunch.org/feingold1. 
html (explaining that the USA PATRIOT Act should be opposed as detrimental to Ameri-
cans’ civil liberties). Russell Feingold was the only senator to vote against the bill that 
would enact the USA PATRIOT Act into law, warning on the day of the vote, “We must 
redouble our vigilance to ensure our security and to prevent further acts of terror. But we 
must also redouble our vigilance to preserve our values and the basic rights that make us 
who we are.” See Brasch, supra note 18, at 7. 
63 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 21. In the brief of amicus curiae in the al Odal v. United 
States, Rasul v. Bush, and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld cases, Fred Korematsu, the plaintiff in the 1942 
case against the U.S. government over the internment of Japanese Americans, was cited as 
arguing against the detention of terrorist suspects without due process of law: 
 It is only natural that in times of crisis our government should tighten the 
measures it ordinarily takes to preserve our security. But we know from long 
experience that we often react too harshly in circumstances of felt necessity 
and underestimate the damage to civil liberties. Typically, we come later to 
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argued that the federal government and TSA would do well to learn 
from the Korematsu decision and particularly Fred Korematsu’s petition 
for a writ of coram nobis.64 In his petition, Mr. Korematsu contended that 
the government knowingly concealed contradictory evidence as to its 
claim of military necessity for the internment of thousands of Japanese 
Americans.65 The U.S. District Court, relying largely on the finding by 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens 
that “a grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens 
of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative 
evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the 
United States during World War II,” granted Mr. Korematsu’s petition 
despite acknowledging that it would be impossible to predict whether 
the concealed evidence may have led the Supreme Court to have 
reached a different outcome in 1942.66 
A. The USA PATRIOT Act 
 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 attracted serious criticism even 
before it was enacted into law.67 Some scholars argued against the 
adoption of the Act because of its double standard of ensuring due 
process for citizens but not for legal immigrants, a violation of equal 
                                                                                                                      
regret our excesses, but for many that recognition comes too late. The chal-
lenge is to identify excess when it occurs and to protect constitutional rights 
before they are compromised unnecessarily. These cases provide the Court 
with the opportunity to protect constitutional liberties when they matter 
most, rather than belatedly, years after the fact. 
Brief for Fred Korematsu as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Rasul et al v. Bush and 
Odah et al. v. United States, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03–334, 03–343); Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Nos. 03–6696). 
64 See Singer, supra note 57, at 317, 321; see also Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s 
Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 451, 473 
(2002) (“[T]hough wartime and national security interests do command an importance 
rarely matched, these interests should not simply grant the government a free pass to tar-
get Arabs merely because it sees fit.”). 
65 See Singer, supra note 57, at 318. 
66 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1114–19 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Singer, 
supra note 57, at 318–19. 
67 See Feingold, On the Anti-Terrorism Bill, supra note 62; Anita Ramasastry, Indefinite 
Detention Based Upon Suspicion: How the Patriot Act Will Disrupt Many Lawful Immigrants’ Lives, 
Findlaw’s Writ, Oct. 5, 2001, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20011005.html. 
There have been varying levels of discontent with the USA PATRIOT Act. See Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Rethinking the Patriot Act 1 (2005). Schulhofer explains that “[f]or 
many Americans, it is synonymous with an egregious and unjustifiable suspension of the 
Bill of Rights. Others, troubled but more cautious, identify the Patriot Act with the grant of 
unprecedented powers that put civil liberties at some risk.” Schulhofer, supra. 
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protection principles embodied in the United States Constitution.68 
Others, such as Senator Feingold, warned that the PATRIOT Act fell 
“short of meeting even basic constitutional standards of due process 
and fairness [because it] continues to allow the Attorney General to 
detain persons based on mere suspicion.”69 
 The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act signaled the beginning of an 
era of reduced judicial oversight of surveillance by the federal govern-
ment.70 Although the Fourth Amendment protects against unreason-
able searches and seizures and normally requires probable cause for 
government interference, no convenient provision exists to explicitly 
define the way the Amendment should be read in light of a potential 
terrorist threat.71 As a result, the USA PATRIOT Act granted the gov-
ernment wide-sweeping investigative powers by permitting it to obtain 
warrants without a demonstration of the truthfulness of its allegations.72 
Furthermore, provisions under Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
granted the Department of Justice the freedom to use administrative 
subpoenas called National Security Letters to obtain records of indi-
viduals’ electronic communications without judicial oversight.73 This 
                                                                                                                      
68 See U.S. Const. amend XIV; Ramasastry, supra note 67. All too prophetically, Rama-
sastry warned in 2001: 
Indefinite detention upon secret evidence—which the Patriot Act allows—
sounds more like Taliban justice than ours. Our claim that we are attempting 
to build an international coalition against terrorism will be severely under-
mined if we pass legislation allowing even citizens of our allies to be incarcer-
ated without basic U.S. guarantees of fairness and justice. 
See Ramasastry, supra note 67. 
69 See Feingold, On the Anti-Terrorism Bill, supra note 62. 
70 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 10. 
71 See Tobias W. Mock, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of 
“Body–Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 213, 215 
(2009). 
72 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
77, 120 Stat. 192 at § 114 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516); Brasch, supra note 18, at 10, 11 
(noting that the government must believe the materials it seeks to be “relevant” to its in-
quiry). Of course, countless political activists and civil libertarians disagreed. As Jameel 
Jaffer, a staff attorney with the ACLU explained: 
The FBI can obtain records . . . merely by specifying to a court that the re-
cords are ‘sought for’ an ongoing investigation. . . . That standard . . . is much 
lower than the standard required by the Fourth Amendment, which ordinar-
ily prohibits the government from conducting intrusive searches unless it has 
probable cause to believe that the target of the investigation is engaged in 
criminal activity. 
Brasch, supra note 18, at 12. 
73 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 15. 
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provision essentially means that National Security Letters enable federal 
officials to obtain information on anyone, because the Act does not re-
quire officials to demonstrate probable cause or a compelling need for 
access to the information.74 
 It was not until 2003 that Attorney General John Ashcroft finally 
admitted in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee that the 
USA PATRIOT Act had lowered the standard of proof for a warrant to 
something “lower than probable cause,” and that it had enabled federal 
officials to investigate citizens who were neither spies nor terrorists.75 
Unfortunately, this admission did not lessen the burden on wrongfully 
targeted minorities who wish to assert their constitutional rights: in ad-
dition to proving a violation of their Fourth Amendment Due Process 
rights, individuals alleging a racial profiling claim against the govern-
ment are required to show that the relevant government agency violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by comply-
ing with a “purposefully discriminatory policy.”76 Not surprisingly, meet-
ing such a high burden of proof is usually difficult, if not impossible 
since government agencies are reluctant to admit such grievous error.77 
B. Presidential Promises Broken, International Treaties Contravened 
 Besides its accountability for constitutional protections against ra-
cial profiling, the United States is also responsible for honoring the 
race-related provisions of international treaties that it has ratified.78 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (“the Convention”) is a United Nations treaty that 
was adopted in order to eliminate racial discrimination and promote 
understanding among all races.79 Along with dozens of other nations, 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. 
75 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 41(2003) (statement of John 
Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
76 See Singer, supra note 58, at 298 n.29 (citing Jeremiah Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling: 
Modeling a Remedy for Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation Cases, 22 Law & Ineq. 73, 
82 (2004)). 
77 See id. at 289 n.30 (citing R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the 
Drug War, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 600 (2003) (“racial profiling is clearly unconstitutional 
only if irrational”)). 
78 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
79 See id. at art. 2, § 1. 
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the United States expressed reservations regarding specific portions of 
the Convention but nevertheless ratified the Convention in 1994.80 
 Echoing the recommendations of the Convention, former Presi-
dent George W. Bush promised in 2001 to end racial profiling in the 
United States.81 It took the government two years to follow through on 
President Bush’s promise, as it was not until June 17, 2003, that the De-
partment of Justice issued its Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal 
Law Enforcement Agencies (“the Guidance”).82 Although the Guidance con-
tains a definition of racial profiling modeled after a definition endorsed 
by AIUSA and other human and civil rights organizations, it “fails to ad-
dress religious and ethnic profiling, provides no enforcement mecha-
nisms for victims of profiling, does little to ensure accountability, and 
provides a blanket exception for cases in which national security is 
threatened.”83 Furthermore, the Guidance is merely advisory and there-
fore lacks the authority of a legally binding statute.84 
 A 2007 report prepared for the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination argues that despite the federal 
governments’ ratification of the Convention, the United States, thirteen 
years after ratification, has failed to “prevent and punish acts of excessive 
force, rape, sexual abuse and racial profiling committed by law en-
forcement officers against people of color.”85 The report additionally 
                                                                                                                      
80 See U.N., Declarations and Reservations of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/viewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (listing the 
declarations and reservations of each nation). In ratifying the Convention, the U.S. Senate 
reserved in relevant part the right of the United States to disregard portions of the Conven-
tion incompatible with the U.S. Constitution’s protections of the freedom of speech, expres-
sion and association. See id. 
81 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at vii; 30. President Bush stated in his Febru-
ary 27, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress, “Earlier today I asked John Ashcroft, 
the Attorney General, to develop specific recommendations to end racial profiling. It’s 
wrong, and we will end it in America.” See id. at vii. President Bush repeated his promise 
later in 2001 during his appearance at the annual convention of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), stating: “Finally, my agenda is based on 
the principle of equal opportunity and equal justice. Yet, for too long, too many African-
Americans have been subjected to the unfairness of racial profiling. That’s why, earlier this 
year, I asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to develop specific recommendations to end 
racial profiling.” See id. at 30. 
82 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 30. 
83 See id. at vii, 30–31; see also Norrell, supra note 42. 
84 See Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at vii. 
85 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 179. Ritchie and Mogul’s report for the U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was prepared on the occasion of 
the U.N. Committee’s review of the United States’ progress under the Convention. See id. 
at 175. 
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alleges that the government has failed to collect and ensure access to 
“comprehensive statistical or other information on complaints, prosecu-
tions, and convictions relating to acts of racism and xenophobia as well 
as compensation awarded to the victims” as required by the Conven-
tion.86 This information is vital to the government’s protection of mi-
norities’ civil liberties because it is required to include records of acts 
perpetrated against civilians by law enforcement officials.87 
 Furthermore, the 2007 report found that the U.S. government has 
failed to take “any meaningful action” to address discriminatory law 
enforcement practices in the United States.88 The report attributed this 
state of affairs to the absence of binding federal legislation that would 
prohibit and monitor the racial profiling by law enforcement officers at 
the federal, state and local level.89 Existing federal guidelines, such as 
the Guidance, have little legal significance because they are not manda-
tory; furthermore, they are inapplicable to the majority of state law en-
forcement agents because, at the time of the report, twenty-six states 
lacked explicit prohibitions on racial profiling by law enforcement offi-
cials.90 The ability of government agencies and independent third par-
ties to evaluate discrimination in law enforcement officials’ treatment 
                                                                                                                      
86 See id. at 204; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Re-
port: General Recommendation XXXI On the Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the Administra-
tion and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System, § 1(A)(1)(5), U.N. Doc A/60/18 (Aug. 19, 
2005). 
87 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 204 (citing CERD, supra note 86, at § 1(A)(1)–
(3)). 
88 See id. at 207. 
89 See id. at 205. 
90 See id. at 205 n.111 (citing Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 33). To demonstrate 
the dearth of binding federal legislation enacted to protect racial minorities, the authors 
point to Congress’s failure to pass the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA), introduced on Feb-
ruary 26, 2004, in the House of Representatives by Congressmen John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) 
and Christopher Shays (R-CT), which would have defined and banned racial profiling at all 
levels of government, prohibited the use of race, ethnicity, national origin or religion in mak-
ing routine spontaneous law enforcement decisions, and provided funding and training for 
data collection and monitoring in compliance with the Act’s terms. See id. The Act also in-
cluded provisions for remedial measures and would allow courts to respond to individual 
complaints by ordering specific police departments to stop engaging in racial profiling. See 
Amnesty Int’l USA, supra note 25, at 30. Along with fourteen colleagues, Senator Feingold 
simultaneously introduced an identical bill in the U.S. Senate, but this bill was also defeated. 
See id. ERPA was reintroduced in the House and Senate in 2004 and 2005, but it “languished 
in committee without ever receiving an up-or-down vote.” See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU 
Applauds Senate Reintroduction Of Racial Profiling Bill, Urges Congress To Finally Pass 
Comprehensive Legislation Next Year (Dec. 19, 2005) (on file with ACLU). Most recently, 
ERPA was reintroduced to the 110th Congress by Senator Feingold and Representative Con-
yers on December 13, 2007. See ACLU, The 110th Congress So Far, http://www. 
aclu.org/legislative/34133leg20080215.html. 
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of minorities is further hindered by the U.S. government’s failure to 
collect the comprehensive statistical information on “acts of excessive 
force, racial profiling, or false arrests and wrongful prosecutions” as 
required by the Convention.91 
 Finally, because individuals seeking remedies must demonstrate 
proof of intent to discriminate, the judicial process itself presents an-
other factor that perpetuates racial profiling.92 In the United States, 
victims of racial profiling have three forms of recourse against law en-
forcement officials who subject them to racial profiling.93 A first option 
is to request that the appropriate government body prosecute the offi-
cial(s), a method that puts the onus of initiating a criminal prosecution 
on the agency that employed the official.94 A second option is to file a 
complaint with an internal disciplinary agency or civilian complaint 
board, but even when such an agency or board exists, fair investigations 
and adequate resolutions are rare.95 The final option is to file a civil 
rights challenge to racial profiling by the government or private indi-
viduals and institutions in the form of a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.96 Overall, however, these mechanisms have been criticized as 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 204. The authors cite a 2006 report issued by 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Statistics entitled Citizen Complaints About Use of 
Force. See id. at 204 n.109. Although the report tracked excessive force complaints filed with 
a police disciplinary agency in 2002 against some fifty-nine percent of U.S. law enforce-
ment officers, the report “failed to collect or analyze the number of excessive force com-
plaints against all law enforcement officers nationwide, or to include information regard-
ing the racial demographics of complainants and officers, or regarding whether any of the 
officers faced any criminal investigation, prosecution or sanctions for any misconduct.” Id. 
The Department of Justice’s report also recognized that the report captured only a small 
portion of allegations of excessive force by law enforcement officials since only an esti-
mated ten percent of individuals actually report such incidents to police disciplinary agen-
cies and only an estimated one percent actually report such incidents to civilian complaint 
review boards. See id. (citing Matthew J. Hickman, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Special Report: Citizen Complaints About Police Use of Force 4 
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf). 
92 See id. at 205. 
93 See id. at 232. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 232–33. 
96 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 232–33; see also Howard Friedman & Charles J. 
DiMare, Strategies in Litigating Intentional Tort Cases, 4 Litigating Tort Cases § 50:46 
(2008) (explaining how challenges to civil rights violations may be brought in court). This 
method was cited at page 157 of the U.S. Report as evidence of compliance with article 6 
of the Convention, which requires member States to assure “everyone within their jurisdic-
tion effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and 
other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination, as well as the right to seek 
from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as 
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“largely ineffective and insufficient to meet the U.S. Government’s ob-
ligations to provide remedies and redress for violations of rights under 
the Convention” because such suits, even in rare instances of success, 
seldom lead to individual or systemic changes in law enforcement poli-
cies and practices.97 
C. The Role of the TSA 
 Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, Congress created the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), an entity now responsi-
ble for the security of domestic U.S. airports as well as all remaining 
United States mass transportation systems.98 The TSA’s aim is to exe-
cute a “risk-based and multi-layered approach to security,” a strategy 
that its immediate past Assistant Secretary, Edmund S. “Kip” Hawley, 
described in a 2007 statement to Congress as requiring “a broad range 
of interlinked measures that are flexible, mobile, and unpredictable.”99 
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), airport 
security measures such as screenings have both a private and public 
component.100 Because the federal government is directly responsible 
for airport security, airports and airlines partner with private entities to 
execute these activities under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
supervision.101 
 No doubt in part to assuage fears that such “flexible, mobile and 
unpredictable” measures risk jeopardizing travelers’ civil liberties, the 
TSA formed an Office of Civil Rights and Liberties and charged the 
External Compliance Division (“the Division”) with ensuring that “the 
civil rights and liberties of the traveling public are respected through-
out screening processes, without compromising security.”102 Among its 
                                                                                                                      
a result of such discrimination.” See CERD, supra note 86, at 98; Ritchie & Mogul, supra 
note 19 at 233. 
97 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 233. 
98 See Aviation & Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (2001); Mock, supra 
note 71, at 215; TSA, supra note 20. 
99 See One Year Later: Have TSA Airport Security Checkpoints Improved?: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t. Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Kip Hawley, Assis-
tant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration). Kip Hawley was succeeded by Acting 
Administrator Gale Rossides in late January of 2009. See TSA, Gale D. Rossides, Acting Ad-
ministrator, http://tsa.gov/who_we_are/people/bios/gale_rossides_bio.shtm (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2009). 
100 See LCCREF, supra note 19, at 27. 
101 See id. 
102 See One Year Later, supra note 99, at 4 (statement of Hawley); TSA, Civil Rights for 
Travelers, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/civilrights/travelers.shtm (last visited Nov. 19, 
2009). 
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several responsibilities, the Division provides “civil rights guidance and 
services to TSA program offices, including security offices, technology 
offices, and communications offices.”103 The Division is also responsible 
for reviewing TSA policies and procedures “to ensure that the civil 
rights and liberties of the traveling public are taken into account.”104 
Additionally, the TSA issued a civil rights policy statement asserting the 
organization’s vision of excellence in transportation security.105 In the 
civil rights policy statement, the TSA pledges that “[w]ith this vision, 
comes a commitment that all TSA employees and the public we serve 
are to be treated in a fair, lawful, and nondiscriminatory manner.”106 
 Besides the confines of the laws of the United States and the TSA’s 
own Civil Rights Policy Statement, the TSA is obligated to comply with 
unique rules applicable to particular modes of transportation— specifi-
cally, civil aviation security rules, maritime and land transportation se-
curity rules, and rules that apply to many other modes of transporta-
tion.107 The airport security rules require that airport operators adopt 
and carry out TSA-approved security programs.108 The rules delineate 
                                                                                                                      
103 See TSA, Civil Rights, supra note 102. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 TSA, Civil Rights Policy Statement 1 (2008), available at http://www.tsa.gov/ 
assets/pdf/civil_rights_policy.pdf. The Civil Rights Policy Statement provides that it is TSA’s 
policy that: 
• TSA employees, applicants for employment, and the public we serve are to be 
treated in a fair, lawful, and nondiscriminatory manner, without regard to race, 
color, national origin, religion, age, sex, disability, sexual orientation, status as a 
parent, or protected genetic information. 
• TSA’s equal employment opportunity policy applies to all personnel and em-
ployment programs and management practices and decisions. 
• TSA will comply with all applicable Federal laws and Executive Orders regarding 
civil rights protections. 
• TSA has no tolerance for harassment in the workplace or in the treatment of the 
public we serve. 
• TSA will not tolerate reprisal against those who exercise their rights under the 
civil rights laws. 
• TSA will scrutinize processes, review results, and work to remove any barriers 
that may impede equal opportunity for recruitment, hiring, promotion, reas-
signment, career development, or other employment benefits. 
• TSA will review and analyze from a civil rights perspective how its programs, 
policies, and operations impact the public we serve. 
Id. 
107 See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101–.307 (2009). 
108 See § 1542.101. Subsections 1542.201 through .209 lay out a variety of security meas-
ures and regulations. § 1542.201 (security of the secured area); § 1542.203 (security of the 
air operations area); § 1542.205 (security of the identification area); § 1542.207 (require-
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the requirements for such programs and discuss expectations for estab-
lished secured areas, air operations areas, security identification display 
areas, security directives issued to airports, and access control sys-
tems.109 
 As TSA’s efforts are constantly expanding, on September 9, 2009, 
it announced that during that day’s morning and evening commutes, 
Amtrak police, TSA personnel, and law enforcement officers from over 
one hundred federal, state and local rail, and transit agencies were de-
ployed at approximately 150 rail stations in the Northeast Corridor as 
“an exercise of expanded counterterrorism and incident response ca-
pabilities.”110 TSA’s far-reaching efforts are also targeting children: On 
September 8, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secre-
tary Janet Napolitano and Girl Scouts of the USA CEO Kathy Cloninger 
announced a new partnership between the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Citizen Corps and the Girl Scouts.111 In addition to collabo-
rating on a “preparedness patch,” which may be earned by Girl Scouts 
of any level who identify and prepare for potential emergencies, learn 
about local alerts, and warning systems and engage in community ser-
vice activities, Secretary Napolitano and Ms. Cloninger formally agreed 
to an affiliation between Citizen Corps and the Girl Scouts.112 Accord-
ing to the TSA press release, this new partnership will “motivate young 
women to become community leaders in emergency management and 
response fields and raises public awareness about personal prepared-
ness, training and community service opportunities.”113 
III. Failed Airport Security “Solutions”, Past and Present 
 In response to the increased airliner hijackings of the 1960s, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) instituted its Anti-Air Hijack 
Profile, a passenger profiling system that identified potential hijackers 
based on a combination of approximately twenty-five empirically-linked 
characteristics that hijackers were thought to possess.114 The luggage of 
                                                                                                                      
ments for the access control systems); § 1542.209 (policy for fingerprint-based criminal 
record checks). 
109 See § 1542.103. 
110 See Press Release, TSA, AMTRAK, TSA and Local Law Enforcement Deploy Across 
Northeast Corridor Rail Stations (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with TSA). 
111 See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano and Girl Scouts of 
the USA Announce New Preparedness Patch (Sept. 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 9. In computer-based profiling, pattern-based or sub-
ject-based data is typically used. See James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and 
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passengers who fit the Anti-Air Hijack Profile was X-rayed or otherwise 
investigated.115 In 1974, Congress enacted two statutes to further im-
prove safety on passenger airlines.116 The Anti-Hijacking Act made it 
illegal to bring a concealed weapon aboard an aircraft, and the Air 
Transportation Security Act required the screening of all carry-on lug-
gage.117 The primary difference between these procedures and passen-
ger profiling is that these procedures were in effect for every passenger, 
regardless of whether they were thought to possess certain characteris-
tics prevalent among terrorists.118 
 Some scholars argue that airline passenger profiling is necessary 
because “screening for bad people is at least as important as screening 
for bad things.”119 Proponents of profiling see it as an effective tool that 
allows security personnel to “use what [they] know” about past terror-
ists to identify potential future ones.120 The FAA, however, found such 
profiling to be ineffective and abandoned it in 1972 in favor of per-
forming X-rays on all passengers’ carry-on luggage.121 
 Although eventually determined to have been caused by a faulty 
fuel tank and not an act of terror, the explosion of TWA flight 800 on 
July 17, 1996 spurred the U.S. government to revisit airline passenger 
                                                                                                                      
National Security, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1459, 1464 (2004). Pattern-based searches are 
typically used in the consumer sector to track customer purchases and prevent credit card 
fraud and identify information that matches or departs from a pattern. See id. On the other 
hand, “subject-based” queries “are data searches that seek information about a particular 
subject already under suspicion based on information derived from traditional investiga-
tive means, whether that subject is represented by a name, a telephone number, or a bank 
account number.” See id. 
115 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 10. 
116 Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the Face of Ter-
rorist Threats, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 847, 852–53 (2000). 
117 See Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, H.R. Rep. No. 93–885, at 1–5; Rhee, supra note 116, 
at 852–53 (citing Air Transportation Security Act of 1947, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356–58 (1988) 
(repealed 1994)). 
118 See Rhee, supra note 116, at 853. In United States v. Slocum, the federal appellate 
court found that because the Anti-Hijacking Profile was based on a “statistical comparison 
of . . . passengers to past hijackers” using “nondiscriminatory indicia characteristic of the 
hijacking problem,” the Profile did not necessarily attempt to establish probable cause and 
therefore was not subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972). 
119 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 2. 
120 See id. at 9. 
121 See id. at 10 (citing Gregory T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers’ Civil 
Liberties, Air & Space L. 3, 6 (1998)) (“In 1972, the last year[] the United States used pro-
files to determine whose carry-on luggage would be X-rayed to stop hijacking, there were 
28 hijackings of U.S. passenger aircraft. Hijacking dropped off when profiling was aban-
doned and every passenger’s carry-on luggage was X-rayed.”). 
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profiling.122 In response to initial fears that terrorists had caused the 
accident, then-President William J. Clinton announced the creation of 
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, also 
known as the “Gore Commission,” on August 22, 1996.123 The Gore 
Commission’s role was to “advise the President on matters involving 
aviation safety and security, including air traffic control” and to “de-
velop and recommend to the President a strategy designed to improve 
aviation safety and security, both domestically and internationally.”124 
Among its several security recommendations, the Gore Commission 
advised in favor of reinstating a form of the FAA’s 1960s passenger pro-
filing system.125 The Gore Commission took care to warn against racial 
profiling and recommended eight important safeguards, the first of 
which was that profiles should not “contain or be based on material of a 
constitutionally suspect nature” such as race, religion or national origin 
and that the elements of a profiling system ought to be developed “in 
consultation with the Department of Justice and other appropriate ex-
perts.”126 The Gore Commission instead recommended that factors to 
                                                                                                                      
122 See id. Government officials did initially believe that terrorists had caused the acci-
dent. See id. 
123 See id. at 10–11. 
124 See Exec. Order No. 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (Aug. 22, 1996). 
125 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 11. The Gore Commission recommended three steps to 
improve and promote passenger profiling: 
First, FBI, CIA, and BATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) 
should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijackers, and 
bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling system. They should 
keep in mind that such a profile would be most useful to the airlines if it 
could be matched against automated passenger information which the air-
lines maintain. 
Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important 
intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in pas-
senger profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its 
sources. Similar systems have been developed to give environmental scientists 
access to sensitive data collected by satellites. 
Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil liberties ques-
tions that arise from the development and use of profiling systems. 
White House Comm’n on Aviation Safety & Sec., Final Report to President Clin-
ton § 3.19 (Feb. 12, 1997), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html. 
126 See White House Comm’n on Aviation Safety & Sec., supra note 125, at § 3.19. 
The Gore Commission Report’s eight recommended safeguards are: 
1. No profile should contain or be based on material of a constitutionally sus-
pect nature—e.g., race, religion, national origin of U.S. citizens. The Com-
mission recommends that the elements of a profiling system be developed in 
consultation with the Department of Justice and other appropriate experts to 
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be considered for government-sponsored profiling should be based on 
“measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are rea-
sonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations” and that 
the factors chosen would need to correspond in a demonstrable way 
with the risk of illegal activity.”127 
A. Four Faulty Generations of Passenger Screening Systems: A Criticism of 
CAPPS I, CAPPS II, Registered Traveler, and the Newly-Launched  
Secure Flight Program 
 The first airline passenger profiling program to be widely imple-
mented in response to the Gore Commission’s findings was the Com-
puter Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS).128 Developed by 
Northwest Airlines in 1996 with an FAA grant, CAPPS was initially pre-
sented not as a profiling system, but rather as a “management tool” that 
would be used “not to pick a needle out of the haystack . . . but to make 
                                                                                                                      
ensure that selection is not impermissibly based on national origin, racial, 
ethnic, religious or gender characteristics. 
2. Factors to be considered for elements of the profile should be based on 
measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are reasonable 
predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. A relationship must be 
demonstrated between the factors chosen and the risk of illegal activity. 
3. Passengers should be informed of airlines [sic] security procedures and of 
their right to avoid any search of their person or luggage by electing not to 
board the aircraft. 
4. Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling system should be 
no more intrusive than search procedures that could be applied to all pas-
sengers. Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or for question-
ing, a person who is selected by the automated profiling system should be 
premised on insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient treatment of 
all passengers. 
5. Neither the airlines nor the government should maintain permanent data-
bases on selectees. Reasonable restrictions on the maintenance of records 
and strict limitations on the dissemination of records should be developed. 
6. Periodic independent reviews of profiling procedures should be made. The 
Commission considered whether an independent panel be appointed to 
monitor implementation and recommends at a minimum that the DOJ, in 
consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically review the profiling stan-
dards and create an outside panel should that, in their judgment, be neces-
sary. 
7. The Commission reiterates that profiling should last only until Explosive 
Detection Systems are reliable and fully deployed. 
8. The Commission urges that these elements be embodied in FAA standards 
that must be strictly observed. 
Id. 
127 See id. at app. A. 
128 See Ravich, supra note 19 at 11–12. 
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the haystack smaller.”129 CAPPS worked by collecting approximately 
thirty-nine pieces of data intended to identify those travelers that war-
ranted being subjected to heightened security procedures.130 The specif-
ics of these data points, however, are unknown because the FAA has de-
clined to reveal the nature of the criteria.131 Predictably, the FAA has 
insisted that race, ethnicity, religion and gender were not factors in the 
CAPPS analysis but refuses to make the profiles or the criterion on 
which the profiles were compiled public, alleging that such transparency 
would eliminate the profiles’ effectiveness.132 Those who have tried to 
discern the factors on which a CAPPS profile is compiled suggest that: 
CAPPS focuses on specific features such as the method of 
payment for an airline ticket (i.e., cash or credit); the timing of 
a purchase (i.e., immediately before departure or much ear-
lier); the identity of travelers, including with whom, if anybody, 
the passenger is traveling; the activity at the destination, in-
cluding whether the passenger intends to rent a car; the flight 
itinerary, including where the flight originates and its ultimate 
destination; the passenger's specific travel plans, including ul-
timate destination when different from the flight on which the 
traveler is aboard; and whether the flight is round trip or one-
way.133 
 In the event that a particular passenger’s profile were to trigger the 
CAPPS system’s selection criteria, that passenger would be identified as 
a “selectee” and would undergo additional security measures.134 The 
type and extent of such measures would depend on several factors, in-
                                                                                                                      
129 See id. at 12 (citing Bill Dedman, FAA Looking to Expand System, Boston Globe, Oct. 
12, 2001, at A27). 
130 See id. 
131 See Rhee, supra note 116, at 865. 
132 See Ravich, supra note 19 at 12; Rhee, supra note 116, at 865. As FAA spokeswoman 
Rebecca Trexler explained, making the FAA’s profiling system public “would be telling the 
terrorist what we’re looking for.” See Michael Higgins, Looking the Part: With Criminal Profiles 
Being Used More Widely to Spot Possible Terrorists and Drug Couriers, Claims of Bias Are Also on the 
Rise, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (1997). 
133 Ravich, supra note 19, at 12. 
134 See id. at 12–13. The security measures taken typically involve “bag-matching,” or 
ensuring that any luggage checked by the passenger be flown only if that passenger boards 
the aircraft, examination by a certified explosive detection system, and the use of other 
advanced technology such as trace detectors and explosive detection devices. See id. at 13. 
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cluding the passenger’s destination and the advanced technology avail-
able.135 
 In 1997, a Department of Justice analysis of CAPPS selection crite-
ria concluded the CAPPS program to be non-discriminatory.136 Not sur-
prisingly, opponents to the profiling program assigned little weight to 
the Department’s conclusions.137 Objections to the use of the CAPPS 
system came primarily in two forms.138 First, CAPPS was criticized as 
ineffective in preventing against certain kinds of terrorist threats, and 
second, the CAPPS system facilitated unconstitutional discrimination as 
well as an invasion of privacy (and possibly enabled identity theft) of all 
those who were vetted by the system.139 Proponents of the first part of 
this argument contended that a computer-assisted passenger screening 
system is insufficient to uncover explosives planted on a terrorist’s un-
suspecting friend or relative.140 For instance, CAPPS’ detractors have 
argued that CAPPS would not have prevented even the earliest docu-
mented U.S. bombing of a commercial airplane—a 1955 incident in 
which a son, scheming to collect on his mother’s life insurance policy, 
planted a bomb in his mother’s luggage.141 
                                                                                                                      
135 See id. at 13. Some scholars have argued that because the CAPPS program identified 
ten of the nineteen September 11 terrorists, profiling and even a “corresponding in-
fringement of some existing travel and privacy rights” may be justified. See id. at 32. Profes-
sor Ravich, for example, argues that the subsequent failure of TSA officials to prevent the 
hijackers from boarding (instead, officials focused on the hijackers’ baggage) constituted a 
failure in enforcement, but not in the CAPPS profiling system. See id. 
136 See id. at 14. 
137 See id. 
138 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 46. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 13, 32–33. It is interesting to compare the American airport security system 
with that of Israel, a nation under constant terrorist threat and where El Al (the primary 
Israeli airline) passengers are routinely subjected to profiling, among other security meas-
ures. See id. at 33. One 1986 incident is telling: when officials selected a pregnant woman 
flying alone from London to Tel Aviv for additional screening, they discovered that a 
bomb had been planted in her suitcase by her Jordanian boyfriend. See id. Not one success-
ful hijacking has ever taken place out of an Israeli airport. See id. 
141 See id. (citing Ted Rohrlich, Response to Terror Aviation Security, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 
2001, at A1). One critic stated: 
How long does it take the United States to counter a threat to commercial 
aviation? In the case of a bomb stowed in luggage in the belly of an airliner, 
the answer is nearly half a century. And counting. Since a man placed a bomb 
in his mother’s suitcase in 1955 and blew up a United Airlines flight over 
Colorado, more than two dozen fatal explosions have been recorded on air-
craft around the world. 
Id. 
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 Proponents of the second part of this argument believe that the 
potential for CAPPS to facilitate unlawful discrimination and the inva-
sion of profiled travelers’ privacy is significant because the integrity of 
CAPPS data and the reliability of CAPPS sources is questionable.142 An-
other concern is that CAPPS profiles and travelers’ personal data may 
be distributed to government agencies beyond the FAA for purposes 
unrelated to terrorism or aviation security.143 As an alternative to 
CAPPS, the ACLU suggested the implementation of methods other 
than profiling, such as, “training security personnel to identify tangible 
evidence of suspected criminal activity on reasonable; articulable bases 
other than stereotypes; screening airline personnel and employees of air 
security vendors (within constitutional means); adding measures to en-
force security standards at foreign airports; and limiting FBI and law en-
forcement access to passenger records” in order to ensure airline pas-
senger privacy without jeopardizing aviation security.144 
 Instead, in 2003, the federal government gave Lockheed Martin a 
five-year grant and $12.8 million during the first year in order to de-
velop an enhancement of CAPPS called CAPPS II.145 TSA intended that 
CAPPS II would “bridge law enforcement and intelligence databases” 
and enable airlines to authenticate commercial airline passengers’ iden-
tities by comparing a travelers’ passenger name record (PNR) against 
governmental databases.146 A large portion of the data used by the 
CAPPS II computer system was obtained from airlines that had already 
once supplied passenger data to the U.S. Army for what was billed as a 
non-CAPPS-like program.147 
                                                                                                                      
142 See id. at 15. 
143 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 15. These concerns regarding personal privacy are not 
unfounded. See id. As the ACLU has pointed out, computerized profile systems permit 
information collected by airlines for non-profiling purposes—to book flights or enroll in 
frequent flyer programs, for example—to be used for other purposes. See id. The informa-
tion computerized profiling systems collect about their passengers includes, inter alia, pas-
sengers’ names, addresses, flight destinations, method of purchasing tickets (who paid and 
the method of payment), whom the passenger traveled with, and whether the passenger 
also reserved a car or hotel. See id. The information might also include passengers’ ad-
dresses over the span of several years, the kinds of cars the passenger owns or has owned 
and the length of ownership of those cars, the names and addresses of businesses the pas-
senger has used, and a list of the newspapers the passenger has subscribed to. See Brasch, 
supra note 18, at 142. 
144 Ravich, supra note 19, at 15 (citing Nojeim, supra note 121, at 7). 
145 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 142. 
146 See id.; Ravich, supra note 19, at 16. A passenger’s PNR typically contains his “full 
name, home address, telephone number and date of birth.” See Ravich, supra note 19, at 
16. 
147 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 142. 
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 Civil liberty and privacy advocates’ primary argument against 
CAPPS II was that it would enable information provided and intended 
for one purpose to be exploited for another.148 CAPPS II would single 
out passengers of interest to the government, even when they posed 
non-travel-related risks, such as those with outstanding warrants and 
those who had filed for bankruptcy or were late paying their bills.149 
This concern proved to be CAPPS II’s undoing, as the use of private 
data provided to the government by commercial data miners could re-
sult in “arrest, deportation, loss of a job, greater scrutiny at various 
screening gates, investigation or surveillance, or being added to a watch 
list.”150 TSA halted the application of CAPPS II after the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report stating that CAPPS II faced 
significant implementation challenges and that “[u]ntil TSA finalizes its 
privacy plans for CAPPS II and addresses [concerns over the combined 
analysis of PNR data with commercial and law enforcement databases], 
we lack assurance that the system will fully comply with the Privacy 
Act.”151 
 Subsequent testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee and an investigation by Wired News revealed that TSA had in 
fact continued to mine data without meeting the safeguards the GAO 
had required.152 By the time the Department of Homeland Security 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 16–17. 
149 See id. at 16. 
150 See Dempsey & Flint, supra note 113, at 1471; Ravich, supra note 19, at 16. In testi-
mony before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, Nancy Holtzman, Executive Director of the Association of Corporate Travel 
Executives argued that CAPPS II was “in direct conflict with privacy policies of most major 
American corporations” and that “distinguished experts on personal freedoms can easily 
make the case that CAPPS II can be extended into every aspect of American life from the 
purchase of train tickets to real estate.” Brasch, supra note 18, at 142. Organizations such 
as the ACLU, the Electronic Privacy Information Center and others similarly argued 
against the implementation of CAPPS II. See id. at 143. 
151 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (GAO), Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges 42 
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf. Among its criticisms, the 
GAO highlighted that TSA had not fully addressed seven of eight issues identified by Con-
gress as issues TSA would have to fully address before CAPPS II could be implemented. See  
id. at 13. 
152 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 143; see also Ryan Singel, JetBlue Shared Passenger Data, 
Wired News, Sept. 18, 2003, http://wired.com/politics/security/news/2003/09/60489 
(reporting on JetBlue officials’ acknowledgment that the airline, assisted by the TSA, pro-
vided five million passenger itineraries to defense contractor Torch Concepts for “proof of 
concept” testing of a Pentagon project unrelated to airline security in 2002); Ryan Singel, 
No Law Broken in Jet Blue Scandal, Wired News, Feb. 21, 2004, http://www.wired.com/ 
politics/security/news/2004/02/62373 (citing a report issued by Department of Home-
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finally suspended CAPPS II in July 2004, about $102 million had been 
spent on the program and another $60 million was earmarked for 
CAPPS II-related spending during the coming fiscal year.153 The De-
partment of Homeland Security claimed that it would review CAPPS II 
data and confine it to the names of potential terrorism suspects, but 
within two weeks of George W. Bush’s reelection, the Department of 
Homeland Security converted CAPPS II into a program called Secure 
Flight and required U.S. airlines to supply the government with per-
sonal data on all of their passengers.154 
 As of December 29, 2008, the government’s Secure Flight program 
aims to ensure the uniform prescreening of passengers on domestic and 
international flights by concentrating the task of passenger watch list-
matching in the hands of the TSA.155 Under the program, the name, 
                                                                                                                      
land Security Chief Privacy Officer Nuala O’Connor Kelly concluding that Homeland Se-
curity had not violated the Privacy Act in sharing its customer database with Torch Con-
cepts). 
153 See Brasch, supra note 18, at 143. 
154 See id. As Ravich explains, the TSA’s willingness to remedy shortcomings in profiling 
systems like CAPPS and Secure Flight provides little consolation for many privacy advo-
cates and civil libertarians because they find intolerable the notion that the federal gov-
ernment, private vendors or both will gain access to passengers’ personal and biometric 
data through programs like Registered Traveler. See Ravich, supra note 19, at 25, 45. Unlike 
CAPPS, CAPPS II and Secure Flight, Registered Traveler is a program in which passengers 
enroll voluntarily. See id. at 25. The program expedites boarding and grants these travelers 
a low-level security clearance. See id. Registered Traveler is administered by four private 
service providers—Verified Identity Pass and Verant Identification Systems, Inc., both 
based in New York; Unisys Corporation, based in Virginia; and Vigilant Solutions, based in 
Florida—at participating airports. See id. at 26 & n.116. A Verified Identity Pass program 
called “Clear” gives travelers a “clear card” in exchange for filling out an application pro-
viding various credentialing information, and paying a membership fee (twenty-eight dol-
lars of which is a TSA enrollment fee). See Secure Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 
(testimony of Sparapani); Ravich, supra note 19, at 27. Critics of Registered Traveler accuse 
the program of giving special treatment to those who can afford it and “misaligning” the 
motive to profit with the need to establish a functional national security system. See Secure 
Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 (testimony of Sparapani); Ravich, supra note 19, at 
27–28. Furthermore, the ACLU has warned that the Registered Traveler Program may 
thwart the anti-terrorism effort by enabling terrorists to discover which of their operatives 
are on terrorist watch lists against which Registered Travelers are compared. See Ravich, 
supra note 19, at 28. The use of identity theft to perpetrate acts of terrorism is also a con-
cern: terrorists might obtain false identification and become Registered Travelers, allowing 
them to take advantage of lessened security screenings to commit acts of terrorism. See id. 
155 See Mock, supra note 71 at 219; TSA, Secure Flight Program, http://www.tsa.gov/ 
what_we_do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). Prescreening 
programs were previously implemented by individual airlines, but the TSA contended that 
such non-uniform enforcement resulted in unnecessary “inconsistencies and misidentifica-
tions.” See Mock, supra note 71, at 219. Under the Secure Flight Program, the Secure Flight 
passenger watch list matching will apply “to all domestic and international passengers trav-
eling on covered aircraft operator flights into, out of, within or over the United States. 
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birth date, gender and itinerary of each passenger is compared against 
government watch lists to identify known and suspected terrorists, pre-
vent individuals on the government’s No Fly Lists from boarding air-
craft, and identify individuals on the government’s selectee lists for en-
hanced screening.156 The TSA insists that Secure Flight does not assign 
security scores to individuals, collect or use commercial data to conduct 
Secure Flight watch list matching or attempt to predict passengers’ be-
havior.157 
 In an August 12, 2009 press release, the TSA announced that it 
would begin the second publicly noticeable security phase of its Secure 
Flight program on August 15, 2009.158 This phase of the TSA’s passen-
ger vetting program involves participating U.S. airlines requiring certain 
passengers to provide their birth date and gender when making air 
travel reservations.159 This step comes on the heels of a phase that be-
gan on May 15, 2009, when airlines participating in the Secure Flight 
program began asking passengers to provide their name as it appears on 
the government-issued identification they will use while traveling in 
making their airline reservations.160 According to its website, TSA’s lar-
ger goal is to vet “100 percent of passengers on all domestic commercial 
flights by early 2010 and 100 percent of passengers on all international 
commercial flights into, out of, or over the U.S. by the end of 2010.”161 
 Critics of Secure Flight are nonetheless as mistrustful of the new 
program as they were of its predecessor, CAPPS II.162 The ACLU, for 
example, has argued that Secure Flight requires the acceptance of the 
“dubious premise” that terrorists use legitimate documentation con-
taining their true names to book airline tickets and to pass airport se-
curity checkpoints.163 Given the frequency of identity theft in the 
                                                                                                                      
Secure Flight will also apply to point-to-point international flights operated by U.S.-based 
aircraft operators.” See TSA, supra. 
156 See TSA, supra note 155. While the program does not require individuals to provide 
other information, such as passport information and known redress numbers to aircraft 
operators, aircraft operators are required to transmit such data to TSA when passengers 
voluntarily provide it to them. See id. The TSA website announcing the launch of the Se-
cure Flight program argues that “[p]roviding the optional information is beneficial to 
passengers as it helps ensure they are not misidentified as a person on a watch list.” See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See Press Release, TSA, Secure Flight Program Enters Next Public Phase (Aug. 12, 
2009) (on file with author). 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See Secure Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 (testimony of Sparapani). 
163 See id. 
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United States and the ability of terrorists to forge identification docu-
ments enabling the purchase of tickets under an assumed name, Se-
cure Flight is likely to result in “False Negatives” and fail to achieve its 
goals.164 Secondly, critics argue that the use of “bloated” No Fly Lists 
will prevent innocent people from traveling and thus deprive them of a 
constitutionally protected right to travel.165 Furthermore, the failure to 
establish a working, comprehensive redress process under CAPPS II 
suggests that those who are wrongly put on the Secure Flight List have 
no guarantee that their names will be removed permanently, if at all.166 
Finally, the ACLU warns that because of the types of names most likely 
to appear on the No Fly and selectee lists, travelers of Arab and Middle 
Eastern descent will be most vulnerable to being targeted for additional 
screenings and prevented from flying altogether.167 
B. Behavioral Profiling: Racial Profiling Poorly Disguised 
 Behavioral profiling appears at first glance to be a race-blind, po-
litically neutral mechanism for ensuring the safety of all passengers.168 
                                                                                                                      
164 See id.; Ravich, supra note 19, at 8. As early as 2003, the U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion estimated that “over a one-year period nearly 10 million people—or 4.6 percent of the 
adult population—had discovered that they were victims of some form of identity theft.” 
See Secure Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 (testimony of Sparapani). Mr. Sparapani 
made clear that the ACLU does not oppose the TSA’s comparison of passenger lists against 
a narrowly constructed list of known terrorists who pose a specific threat to aviation security. See 
id. 
165 Secure Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 (testimony of Sparapani) (citing 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (confirming the existence of a “constitu-
tional right to travel from one State to another”) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
643 (1969) (concluding that the right to travel is “assertable against private interference as 
well as government action . . . a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the 
Constitution to us all”)). 
166 See Secure Flight & Registered Traveler, supra note 28 (testimony of Sparapani). Mr. 
Sparapani argued in February 2006, “if TSA cannot build a redress process after nearly 
four and one-half years for Secure Flight to prevent against civil liberties violations, how 
can TSA be trusted to build an effective, civil liberties–respecting passenger pre-screening 
program?” See id. Mr. Sparapani’s fears are not unfounded: On January 5, 2005, Maya 
Shaikh, an American citizen and a graduate of Stanford University School of Law, was ar-
rested by the FBI, led through Honolulu International Airport before her own teenage 
daughter and other airport patrons in handcuffs, detained, questioned and placed in a 
holding cell because her name was on a No-Fly List. See James Fisher, What Price Does Society 
Have to Pay for Security? A Look at the Aviation Watch Lists, 44 Willamette L. Rev. 573, 573 
(2008). Subjected to secondary security screenings and unpleasant interrogations on sub-
sequent trips, Ms. Shaikh contacted TSA to have her name cleared from the list. See id. at 
574. She was informed, however, that her name would not be removed from the list and 
that “this was the price she and society ha[d] to pay for security.” See id. 
167 See Fisher, supra note 166, at 573. 
168 Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 217. 
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Grasping at this superficial solution, federal and state agencies and law 
enforcement bodies—ranging from the Department of Homeland Se-
curity itself to local police departments—have issued security advisories 
to guide officials and civilians alike as to what constitutes “suspicious” 
behavior.169 Unfortunately, this unscientific practice threatens to dis-
guise some racial profiling as permissible behavior and risks doing more 
harm than good in the effort to ensure aviation security.170 
1. Inadequate Training 
 As discussed above, critics have accused TSA’s weeklong Screening 
of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program, an existing 
system for training security officials to identify suspicious behavior, of 
being a grossly inadequate preparatory tool.171 The program is designed 
to teach security personnel to employ objective criteria to identify indi-
viduals who are trying to disguise their emotions.172 Under it, TSA offi-
cers compare the suspicious behavior indicators they observe in passen-
gers against a list of approximately thirty behaviors that are assigned 
numerical scores.173 When a passenger’s score exceeds a certain prede-
termined sum, that passenger is questioned by an officer.174 If the con-
versation arouses further suspicion, as happens in approximately twenty 
percent of cases, the passenger is considered for a secondary search.175 
 The SPOT training program entails a mere four days of classroom 
training on observation and questioning techniques and three days of 
“field practice” and prepares officers to look for suspicious behavioral 
                                                                                                                      
169 See id. 
170 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 103. 
171 See id. Apart from the SPOT program, transportation security officers are required 
to complete a minimum of one hundred hours of training—forty hours of classroom train-
ing and sixty hours of on-the-job training to receive certification permitting them to ad-
minister the checkpoint screening process. See Mock, supra note 71, at 216–17. This certifi-
cation allows TSA security personnel to conduct primary screening searches, the routine 
searches currently performed on all passengers regardless of the level of suspicion they 
arouse. See id. at 217. These routine searches entail the use of magnetometers (metal de-
tectors) and baggage scanning machines that are employed at screening checkpoints. See 
id. at 217–18. 
172 See Mock, supra note 71, at 218. 
173 See id. at 218–19. 
174 See id. at 219. 
175 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 219. Whether a conversation arouses further suspi-
cion is determined on a case-by-case basis by individual security officials employing the 
SPOT technique, meaning that this subjective standard has the potential to mask discrimi-
natory conduct. See id. 
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indicators, such as “vocal timbre, gestures, and facial movements.”176 
TSA’s officials are required only to have a high school diploma and to 
pass a criminal background check.177 However, longer training pro-
grams alone do not seem to be the answer, because human beings, not 
error-proof machines, are ultimately responsible for the profiling.178 
Even if the danger of racially-based motivations could be eliminated 
from behavioral profiling, “discriminatory determinations” may still 
lead security officials to identify “quirky” passengers as potential terror-
ist threats.179 
 As some critics have warned, “[for terrorists],[l]earning to defeat 
poorly-trained screeners is a lot easier than learning to fly a jumbo 
jet.”180 If the security measures that have thwarted all hijacking attempts 
at Ben-Gurion airport near Tel Aviv, Israel, are to be implemented in 
the United States, the type of individuals chosen as security officers will 
need to change.181 In Israel, most security officers are recruited from 
the military and are subjected to stringent tests to eliminate “all but 
those with above–average intelligence and particularly strong personal-
ity types.”182 Israeli airport security personnel are given nine weeks of 
behavior recognition training, but all departing passengers are inter-
viewed, all passengers are subjected to one-on–one searches, and the 
behavioral profiling program is supplemented by other security meas-
ures, including an extensive sky marshall program.183 Not surprisingly, a 
primary goal of this system is to eliminate potentially discriminatory 
judgment calls while ensuring universal safety.184 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Mock, supra note 71, at 218; Bernard E. Harcourt, Search and Defend, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 25, 2006, at A21. 
177 See Harcourt, supra note 176. 
178 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 33. In contrast, the Israeli airline El Al, whose planes 
have never been hijacked, offers passengers the protection of officers recruited largely 
from the Israeli military. See Harcourt, supra note 176. These officers are subjected to 
stringent tests and undergo over two months of behavior recognition training. See id. 
179 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 33. As Professor Ravich astutely points out, “[n]aturally, 
not every passenger who is anxious about flying, with sweaty palms and nervous move-
ments, is a terrorist.” Id. 
180 See Harcourt, supra note 176. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. One-on-one searches of passengers by El Al officials have been reported to 
take an average of 57 minutes per person. See id. 
184 See id. 
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2. A Cover for Racism 
 Because behavioral profiling requires security officials to identify 
conduct that is perfectly natural in a variety of situations, those whose 
actions triggers scrutiny under this security method are prone to abuse 
by security officers based on “race-based preconceptions as to which 
racial groups are more likely to represent a ‘terrorist’ threat.”185 Critics 
warn that security officials engaged in behavioral profiling will dispro-
portionately scrutinize racial and ethnic minorities and ‘observe’ suspi-
cious behavior where none actually exists, causing racially disparate 
impacts similar to those caused by racial profiling.186 The brunt of this 
discrimination, critics warn, will be borne by those who are (or are per-
ceived to be) Muslim, Arab and South Asian, wrongly reinforcing the 
idea that terrorist suspects can be successfully identified by their race, 
ethnicity or religion and reiterating prejudicial stereotypes in the mind 
of the public instead of devoting resources to “genuine threats to secu-
rity.”187 
 A prime example of the inappropriateness of behavioral profiling 
is the list of behaviors the Department of Homeland Security deter-
mined to be “indicative behaviors of suicide bombers.”188 The list of 
behaviors—a list that fails to recognize legitimate motives for any of the 
described conduct—includes culturally and racially insensitive items 
such as “clothing is loose,” “clothing is out of sync with the weather,” 
“pale face from recent shaving of beard,” and “does not respond to au-
thoritative voice commands or direct salutation from a distance” as well 
as statements that could easily apply to any traveler, such as “eyes ap-
pear to be focused and vigilant,” “suspect may be carrying heavy lug-
gage, bag or wearing a backpack,” and “suspect is walking with delibera-
tion but not running.”189 Likewise, the item, “behavior is consistent 
                                                                                                                      
185 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 217–18 (citing Ctr. for Hum. Rts. & 
Global Justice, Irreversible Consequences: Racial Profiling and Lethal Force in 
“The War on Terror” 29–30 (2006), available at http://www.CHRGJ.org/docs/CHRGJ 
Irreversible Consequences.pdf). 
186 See Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 19, at 217–18. 
187 See Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Global Justice, supra note 185, at 30; Ritchie & Mo-
gul, supra note 19, at 218–19. 
188 See Advisory, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al-
Qaeda’s Possible Threats to the Homeland (Sept. 4, 2003). 
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with no future, e.g., individual purchases one-way ticket or is uncon-
cerned about receipts for purchases, or receiving change,” might have 
some correlation with the behavior of a terrorist; it could also apply to 
individuals who are wealthy, scatterbrained, or just in a hurry.190 
IV. The Constitutionally-Viable, Race-Blind Solution for 
American Airports: A Universally Stringent 
 Physical Security Program 
 In an address on the future of air travel delivered at the October 
29, 2001 Freedom Versus Fear: The Future of Air Travel Conference, Robert 
Crandall, former president and chairman of American Airlines de-
clared, “You want to travel on the airline system? You give up your pri-
vacy. You don't want to give up your privacy? Don't fly. Your privacy isn't 
equal to the safety of the rest of us.”191 Like Professor Timothy M. 
Ravich, this author rejects the argument that commercial airline pas-
sengers must choose between security, liberty and privacy.192 Instead, a 
compromise must be reached and a new national aviation security sys-
tem must be implemented.193 
 Because today’s airline security programs identify potential terror-
ists largely, if not entirely, based on passengers’ racial, national, reli-
gious or ethnic origins, these programs are racially discriminatory and 
therefore unconstitutional.194 Furthermore, the majority of TSA’s secu-
rity initiatives, past and present, contravene the Convention for the 
                                                                                                                      
the United States. See id. Still other behavioral profiles have been known to explicitly name 
Muslims as targets for suspicion. See id. As recently as October 4, 2007, the behavioral pro-
file available on the Temple Terrace, Florida police department website explicitly refer-
enced Muslim individuals in declaring it suspicious for an individual to “expend[] energy 
not to stand out as a Muslim, despite professed Islamic beliefs.” See id. at 218 & n.162. Per-
haps because of the thoroughness of the 2007 report prepared for the U.N. Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination the Temple Terrace police department has since 
revised its website. See Temple Terrace Police Department, Homeland Security Terrorist 
Indicators, http://www.templeterrace.com/police/terrorist.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
As of October 19, 2009, the website’s closest association between Muslims and terrorism is 
the inclusion of “Jihadist literature, terrorist training manuals, security plans, encoded 
materials, or instructions for the use of codes and ciphers in residence or vehicle” in its list 
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190 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 188. 
191 See Ravich, supra note 19, at 5 & n.14. 
192 See id. Professor Ravich, however, endorses an aviation security policy “in which pro-
filing plays an integral and lawful role.” See id. at 5. This author disagrees that any level of 
racial profiling may be lawful. See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution 174–75 
(2006). 
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Elimination of Racial Discrimination as ratified by the U.S. govern-
ment.195 In situations where officials seek to identify terrorist threats 
but do not conduct investigations based on specific descriptions of sus-
pects, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection demand that no distinctions be made among com-
mercial airline travelers.196 As dissenting Supreme Court Justice John 
Harlan wrote in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
In view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There 
is no caste here. . . . In respect of civil rights, all citizens are 
equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most 
powerful. The law regards man as man . . . when his civil rights 
as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.197 
 Rather than selectively using behavioral profiling or expensive 
computer programs (like CAPPS, CAPPS II, Registered Traveler and 
Secure Flight) that employ secret and possibly unconstitutional criteria 
to calculate the risk posed by particular passengers, the TSA should in-
vest its resources in improving physical screening capabilities such as 
baggage screening technology and training security officials who can 
properly conduct one-on-one searches of all commercial airline pas-
sengers.198 As one critic has argued, 
 If we want to change the system, a better idea would be to 
eliminate most carry-ons and emulate high-security prisons. 
 Sure, this would not be 100 percent foolproof. But, in com-
bination with our sky marshal program, it would be far more 
likely to prevent future terrorist hijackings than giving a 
bunch of unqualified screeners a cursory education in face 
reading.199 
                                                                                                                      
195 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 78. 
196 See U.S. Const. amends IV, XIV. 
197 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
198 See Harcourt, supra note 176 at A21. 
199 See id. Harcourt reports that in his experience, most prisons operate in the same 
way: “[F]irst I check my briefcase, overcoat, belt, cell-phone and all unnecessary items at 
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 Fortunately, the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and 
Technology Directorate (“the Directorate”) has already begun to de-
velop several new innovations to improve TSA’s screening capabili-
ties.200 Over the past year, the Directorate has developed a plethora of 
new screening and detection technologies in working towards its 2010 
congressional deadline of screening 100% of cargo carried onto com-
mercial airplanes.201 Among other initiatives, a congressionally-directed 
Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program has been completed, a 
Digital Imaging and Communications for Security standard has been 
developed as the accepted imaging file format that will enable data ex-
changes between security screening equipment, the feasibility of creat-
ing a Magnetic Visibility program to identify the chemical contents of 
any liquid being carried through a security checkpoint has been con-
firmed, and homemade Explosives detection technologies and screen-
ing methods are in development.202 
 Rather than spending millions of tax dollars on programs that pro-
file and inadvertently discriminate against minority passengers, the TSA 
should concentrate on the continued development and expansion of 
these and other physical security initiatives.203 To encourage the TSA to 
develop the necessary technology, binding federal legislation should be 
passed to prohibit, monitor and provide redress for unconstitutional 
racial profiling in airports.204 If the implementation of advanced tech-
nology security programs forces airports to spend more time and hu-
man capital on screening passengers, so be it: not only does this ap-
proach avoid unconstitutional scrutinizing of those who fit into 
protected class categories, but this method will enable TSA to identify 
individuals like Richard Reid, John Walker Lindh, and Marwan al-
Shehhi (those intending to commit acts of terror) as well as individuals 
like Jeffrey Goldberg and Nathaniel Heatwole (those merely seeking to 
underscore the inadequacies of existing national security measures).205 
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 Critics of this method are likely to argue that such an elaborate, 
“Big Brother” —style physical security system is untenably expensive 
and even unnecessary since the overwhelming majority of airline pas-
sengers are not terrorists.206 Significantly more frightening, however, 
are the warnings of some critics of the current security regime that TSA 
will soon develop variations of existing behavioral and computerized 
profiling programs and regularly apply them to other, non-aviation 
forms of travel.207 This fear is not unfounded, as the TSA’s complete 
objective is to ensure the security of all U.S. transportation systems, in-
cluding city mass transit systems, trains, railroads, busses and airports.208 
In addition, the argument that a universally stringent physical security 
system does not offer the least intrusive means of ensuring public avia-
tion safety is misguided, because it measures “least restrictive” by the 
number of people searched and not the disparity in treatment between 
those searched and not searched.209 Finally, those who opposed CAPPS 
II’s use of personal data originally supplied to airlines for reasons unre-
lated to terrorism should be pleased to note that an enhanced, ad-
vanced physical security system requires no special data because it pre-
sumes that each passenger is equally capable, if not of acting as a 
terrorist, then of being targeted by one as a “bomb mule.”210 
 Rather than spending millions of dollars on computerized security 
clearance systems that terrorists will strive to avoid with fake IDs, fake 
boarding passes and Registered Traveler cards, federal funding should 
be used to buttress intelligence and emergency response programs and 
to design an efficient way to search and X-ray every individual passen-
ger’s person and belongings in an expedient but effective manner.211 
Larger waiting rooms and a longer check-in process, as well as a verita-
ble obstacle course of bomb-sniffing dogs, trace detectors, high-tech 
body scanners and thousands of new TSA baggage screeners will likely 
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be required to implement this policy.212 Increasing security precautions 
in this way could be massively expensive.213 Nevertheless, having to be 
at the airport for an extra hour or two before one’s flight is a small 
price to pay in exchange for protecting not only all travelers’ physical 
safety, but also each passenger’s constitutionally guaranteed civil 
rights.214 
Conclusion 
 Racial profiling, or indicia of it, is unconstitutional and often inef-
fective in eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks on commercial air-
craft. In fact, the use of racial profiling to detect terrorists hinders the 
anti-terrorist effort more than it bolsters it: profiling serves to “divert[] 
precious anti-terrorism resources, alienate[] potential allies in the anti-
terrorism struggle, and is inconsistent with cherished notions of free-
dom and equality” because it is contrary to basic rights guaranteed by 
the U.S. Constitution.215 As others have suggested, the ability to travel 
by airplane is not a right, but rather a privilege.216 Those who would 
prefer not to have their things and their person carefully examined are 
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of course free to travel by other means.217 In the meantime, uniform 
screening of airline passengers achieves several goals. First, it eliminates 
the discrepancy in the way TSA treats individuals in light of their cul-
tural, ethic and religious backgrounds. Second, it provides for ‘equal 
scrutiny’ and thus ensures equal protection. Third, it prevents the pos-
sibility that unsuspecting passengers whose profiles fail to trigger a 
match with the government’s No Fly and selectee lists under Secure 
Flight will board flights while unknowingly carrying ticking explosive 
devices. 
 Decades ago, security experts realized that profiling is less effective 
than consistent, uniform X-raying of each passenger’s luggage, suggest-
ing that a combination of X-raying and the development of more ad-
vanced screening devices would bring the government significantly 
closer to developing an aviation security system that is both effective and 
constitutionally sound. Even if it is not mandated by the government, 
TSA can and should establish a universal, race-blind approach and cor-
responding procedures to establish airline security programs that can 
simultaneously eliminate threats to aviation security without infringing 
on travelers’ constitutional rights.218 
 Achieving security for all commercial airline passengers while refus-
ing to compromise on travelers’ civil liberties? Nothing could be more 
patriotic. 
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